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THE ENGINEERS IN THE PRICE SYSTEM
Alfred A. DeSimone, Jr.*
AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE RISE OF
CORPORATE CAPITALISM. By David F. Noble. New York: Alfred A.

Knopf. 1977. Pp. xxvi, 384. $12.95.
INTRODUCTION

Nearly everyone would agree that advanced industrial society would be unthinkable without its complex, scientifically
based technology. In discussing the growth of modern technology,
however, scholars as well as laymen have often committed the sin
Marxian theorists call "reification"-that is, they have mistaken
the creations of particular societies in particular times and places
for sovereign forces that move by their own internal logic to determine human actions. To David F. Noble, the author of America
by Design, the currency of this reified notion of science and technology seems paradoxical, for during the very time in which that
notion has risen to importance, modern technology as a social
process has come increasingly "under the conscious control of
human authority, in the specific form of private corporate capital" (p. xxvi). In this important new study, Noble tries to break
through the paradox, to reveal the human and social realities
behind the "myth of the machine," by tracing the development
of modern technology within its American matrix-corporate
capitalist society.
Noble's "primary thesis" is explicitly Marxian. In his view,
American technology has evolved in symbiosis with corporate
capitalism: technology has provided capitalism "the wherewithal
for unlimited productive growth by implicating science in the
production process," while the corporation has cleared the way
for the use of technology by "offsetting the destructive tendencies
inherent in an unchecked, competitive market economy by making possible the regulation of production, distribution and
prices." The tendency of this symbiosis, he believes, has been to
preserve and even to strengthen the basic social relations of capitalism· by giving them an appearance of rationality and efficiency; as a result what Marcuse calls a "technological veil" has
* Graduate student, Department of History, University of Massachusetts. B.A. 1970,
Harvard University; M.A. 1976, University of Massachusetts.-Ed.
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been thrown over a system that remains unjust and exploitive (p.
xxiii).
In trying to establish this thesis-to rend, as it were, the
technological veil-Noble has obviously set himself a large task.
True to his conception of technology as a social product, he has
chosen to approach his task through an extensive analysis of the
class most responsible for giving American technology its characteristic form-the engineering profession, and especially those
engineers connected with the vanguard of "science-based" industry, the chemical and electrical industries. Occupying key positions within the technologically most advanced sectors of the corporate economy, these men, along with like-minded professors
and executives, were in Noble's view the catalysts in the compounding of technical and capitalist reason. They allegedly performed this service in the period between 1900 and 1930 by designing-in accordance with a "world-view of corporate reform"-new customs and institutions that would bring society as
a whole into closer conformity with the needs of science-based
industrial corporations {p. xxv).
The thesis advanced in America by Design deserves careful
consideration, for the issue of whether corporations have come to
dominate modern technology and its practitioners has obvious
significance in wider realms than the history of engineering per
se. Noble's argument also bears directly on the status of modern
professions in general, for, as we shall see, it challenges the notion that professional autonomy is possible when large private
corporations control access to the most remunerative forms of
professional practice and have a strong influence over professional education. He implicitly attacks as well a commonly held
notion about "post-industrial" society, namely, that as expert
professionals make more and more of the decisions in both the
public and private sphere, older questions of class conflict are
becoming obsolete. The actual historical relationship between a
key component of the so-called "new class" of professionals and
private corporate capital clearly provides a test of the validity of
this idea. Finally, Noble's portrait of engineering, according to
the Foreword by Christopher Lasch, forms part of a comprehensive critique of modern American capitalism that is being developed by recent left-wing scholarship. This critique centers on the
so-called "second industrial revolution" that occurred roughly
between 1880 and 1930, and Noble's contribution attempts to
show how engineers participated during that era in forging the
basic tools that would eventually make the world safe for oligop-

Jan.-Mar. 1979]

Engineers in the Price System

687

oly (pp. xi-xiii).
America by Design thus addresses several important questions. But the degree to which the book in its various parts illuminates each one varies. Because of this, because much of the evidence Noble draws upon is unfamiliar, even to American historians, and because the many strands from which he weaves his
"primary thesis" are themselves of interest, it seemed best in this
review to follow his argument step by step. Once the merits and
faults of the parts fall into perspective, the meaning of the whole,
it is hoped, will emerge more clearly.

I
The so-called "corporate reform" efforts of engineers after
1900 form the centerpiece of Noble's discussion; the second and
third of the three parts into which the book is divided chronicle
those efforts. The first part of America by Design sketches the
background; it tells the story of how technology, as represented
by the professional engineer, became "wedded" to industry, as
represented by the giant corporation. Here also, by cataloging the
social problems corporate capitalism faced in the early twentieth
century, Noble tries to recreate the atmosphere which gave corporate reform its sense of urgency.
Noble's contentions in Part I are central to his argument as
a whole, for they outline the actual state of affairs which the
engineers' social "designs" supposedly both assumed and meant
to perpetuate. That state of affairs can be described as follows:
after emerging late in the nineteenth century, science-based industry-which Noble defines as "industrial enterprise in which
ongoing scientific investigation and the systematic application of
scientific knowledge to the process of commodity production have
become routine parts of the operation" (p. 5)-experienced great
expansion and concentration between 1880 and 1920. In the two
leading science-based industries in particular, first in the electrical and later in the chemical industry, the need to consolidate
and exploit patent control over important inventions and processes combined with more general forces encouraging industrial
combination to usher in an age of giant corporations {p. 18).
Because these firms were the first to institutionalize the application of scientific method to manufacturing operations, they set
the pattern for other highly technological enterprises, such as the
petroleum, rubber, and auto industries.
During the same period in which industry was increasingly
coming under the control of large corporations, the profession of
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engineering was taking its modern form. In the training of engineers, formal education at the college level was becoming the
norm, and "shop-floor" experience was fading into the past.
Chemical and electrical engineering had initiated this change; in
these fields, unlike mechanical engineering; a true "shopculture"-the historian Monte Calvert's term for a form of professionalism based on the primacy of on-the-job training in industry-had never developed. 1 Here the roles of basic science and
laboratory training had been crucial from the start, and the locus
of this sort of expertise was the universities and technical schools
(pp. 26-27). As all of industry grew technologically more complex,
formalized "scientific" training came to rule all types of engineering and thus largely to define the professional engineer.
While the image of the applied scientist was coming to represent half of the modern engineer's self-concept, the changes in
industry mentioned above were insuring that the image of the
corporate team-player would emerge as the other half. The domination of science-based industry by giant, vertically integrated
corporations precluded, for the vast majority of engineers, older
forms of professional practice such as business ownership and
independent consulting. Instead, effective work within corporate
hierarchies became the principal route to professional success,
and the best-rewarded corporate work lay in management. Thus,
when one of Noble's key figures, William Wickenden-himself a
successful _engineer-manager and teacher-undertook a massive
study of engineering education in the 1920s, he found that the
career patterns of two-thirds of the engineering graduates since
1884 had shown "a healthy pattern of progression through technical work toward the responsibilities of management." Wickenden's advice to ambitious engineers, was succinct, if unsurprising: To succeed financially and socially, they would eventually
have to "leave the engineering of materials and enter the engineering of men" (p. 41).
In Noble's view, then, the marriage between the sciencebased corporation and the professional engineer was on firm
ground by 1920, for "the large corporations needed the technical
knowledge which only the professionals could provide. On the
other hand the professional engineers required human organization and material resources in order to render their knowledge
1. Calvert expounds this idea of a "shop culture" and discusses the conflict between
it and the more modem "school culture" in his book, ThE MECHANICAL ENGINEERS IN
AMERICA,

1830-1910 (1967).
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functional, and the large corporations had secured a monopoly on
these" (pp. 43-44). It is important to note, however, that Noble
does not claim these intrusive realities prevented engineers from
developing and at times using a more traditional kind of professional identity-i.e., the one based on the "monopoly of esoteric
knowledge" common to doctors, lawyers, and scientists (p. 40);
he claims only that the old-style "corporate" identity was bound
to be less significant than the new in guaranteeing professional
prestige and success. The new style of professionalism, he insightfully points out, also directly undermined the old in two ways.
First, the need to advance as individuals within corporate hierarchies inhibited any sense of collegial autonomy engineers might
have had as a class of experts. Second, the importance of
corporate priorities in the minds of actual or potential erigineermanagers detracted from the sense of personal autonomy that the
"independent expert" often feels (pp. 41-42).
Having established to his satisfaction the state of sciencebased industry and the engineering profession in the early twentieth century, Noble devotes a brief chapter to the social and
e.conomic problems corporate America faced at that time. The
picture he presents derives from the familiar critique of American
corporate capitalism developed by "New Left" historians like
William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, and James Weinstein.2 Thus Noble asserts that after a period of intense, often
chaotic price· competition and expansion of output in the late
nineteenth century, a wave of mergers and consolidations spread
through American business around 1900. The-temporary stability
and high profitability that monopoly and oligopoly brought could
not be maintained through stasis, however. To survive, American
capitalism needed new means of insuring continuous, · efficient
utilization of expensive manufactlµ"ing facilities; expanded opportunities for the investment of monopoly profits; and expanded, stable markets for an unprecedented volume of goods
(pp. 54-55). In the social sphere, the emerging corporate order had
to face threats to social stability and to the continued dominance
of capital that might make these· economic goals unattainable.
Among these threats Noble includes: the tremendous surge of
immigration from southern and eastern Europe; the rise of a
2. In particular, see G.

KoLKO,

THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963); J.

WEINSTEIN,

THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LmERAL STATE 1900-1918 (1968); W.A. WILLIAMS, THE CoNTOURS OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1961); and the work of the economists P. BARAN & P. SWEEZY,
MONOPOLY CAPITAL (1966).
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strong social-reform movement in Progressivism; and, especially,
the mounting challenge from organized labor and from large,
highly visible radical organizations like the Socialist Party and
the Industrial Workers of the World (pp. 55-60).
Given their position in the social order, Noble tells us, the
reaction of engineers to such a social and economic situation was
predictable, though important nonetheless. Except for a few maverick engineer-reformers like the Taylorite Morris Cooke, most
"progressive-minded" engineers understood-and probably approved of-the fact that "radical engineers . . . had to choose
between being radical and being engineers" (p. 63). Thus, they
hoped to bring to pass whatever visions they had of an "affluent,
humane, tranquil, and powerful America" by pursuing the twin
goals of technological progress and corporate growth-the poles
around which their own careers revolved (p. 64). Because they
believed corporate growth was a necessary condition for (or even
the raison d'etre for) social improvement, Noble's engineers were
close to being "corporate liberals," a group whose importance
remains a controversial issue in American historiography. But
fortunately he does not have to confront this problem directly,
since the "corporate reforms" his engineers promoted shared a
technological flavor that allows them to be treated separately
from the usual list of "corporate liberal" causes, such as labormanagement cooperation and limited government regulation of
business. 3
Before analyzing the actual attempts of corporate engineers
to "design" new social institutions, we need to assess how adequately Noble has portrayed the preconditions summarized
above. First of all, his discussion of professionalization in chemical and electrical engineering is quite strong and genuinely adds
to the understanding of the engineering profession provided by
previous historical works like Calvert's and like Edwin Layton's
Revolt of the Engineers (1971). Still, even though it is meant only
to prepare for the "designs" that follow, the first part of the book
has serious faults. Thus, while the majority of the corporate engineers to be treated later in the book came from the ranks of
electrical engineers, the initial development of the electrical man3. For recent works which use the concept of "corporate liberalism," see those cited
in note 2 supra, as well as .J. GILBERT, DESIGNING THE INDUSTRIAL STATE (1972); R. RAoosH
& M. ROTHBARD, A NEW HISTORY OF LEVIATHAN (1972); and .J. ISRAEL, BUILDING THE ORGAN!•
ZATION OF SOCIETY (1972). The concept has often been criticized, most extensively in K.
McQuaid, A Response to Industrialism: Liberal Businessmen and the Evolving Spectrum
of Capitalist Reform (1975) (unpublished dissertation, Northwestern University).
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ufacturing industry itself-the economic base, as it were, on
which their superstructure of projects was erected-receives insufficient attention; only seven pages of direct discussion and
analysis are included in Part I, to which fifteen more are added
later. Furthermore, all of the fifteen and most of the original
seven are devoted to a single set of problems-i.e., those surrounding the control of patents and inventions. The hard data
that could establish claims about the industry's economic concentration, its profitability, and the size and complexity of its
manufacturing facilities relative to other sectors are omitted. The
same problem is even more acute for the chemical industry. This
failure is especially critical because both these industries are so
wide-ranging that generalizations built on the handful of examples included-such as the cases of electric lightbulbs and radios-cannot be safely carried to all product and service lines. 4
A lack of information about vital issues also mars Noble's
sketch of the social and economic situation at the start of the
century. Though the reader does not require a detailed retelling
of the story of "monopoly capital," he does need to know how and
why the science-based industries specifically came to feel the
economic pressures that Noble asserts affected corporate capitalism as a whole. Noble's general summary merely assumes the
basics of monopoly capital; it does nothing to prove their applicability to the case at hand. Sfmilarly, Noble assures us that the
science-based industries felt the unsettling effects of social protest and reform movements. Yet aside from mentioning a strike
or two, the electoral strength of Socialists in towns like Schenectady-a center of General Electric operations-and, much later
in the book, the opposition of workers to Frederick W. Taylor's
version of scientific management, he omits any detailed account
of the interactions that must have occurred between sciencebased firms and the social movements of 1900 to 1930. Thus, in
both the economic and social spheres his account would have
benefitted from fewer familiar generalizations about capitalist
America and more specifics about the social and economic history
of the industries he knows best.
This deficiency is especially puzzling when one looks at the
restricted range of "corporate reforn;i" discussed in Parts II and
4. This point is stressed, for example, by the economist Jules Backman in his studies
of both industries in recent times. See ,J. BACKMAN, THE Ec0No1111cs OF THE ELECTRICAL
MACHINERY INDUSTRY (1962); .J. BACKMAN, THE EcoNOIIIICS OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
(1970).
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ill of America by Design. The very general framework developed
in Part I could open outward toward all sorts of "corporate liberal" causes: the reshaping of America in line with corporate
needs was to be an epic undertaking. But instead Noble chronicles only an inner circle of ideas and institutions, all closely related to the process of production in science-based industry itself.
This set of projects he summarizes under the following categories:
"standardizing science and industry, reforming the patent system, routinizing research, transforming education, and developing modern management" {p. 321). The specificity of these reforms seems to demand a specific explanatory context for them,
a context provided for technical education and partially for patents and research, but not for the others.
The lack of economic background material also weakens
Noble's case because it leaves him with no effective reply to an
alternative explanation of the shape of science-based industry,
one that relies more on its technological essence and less on the
general character of monopoly capital. Thus, Alfred D. Chandler,
in his 1977 study of the evolution of business enterprise in America, The Visible Hand, concludes that the effort to gain monopoly
profits and perpetuate the conditions for exacting them has not
been sufficient to establish or to preserve concentration or vertical integration in American industry. Instead, Chandler argues,
vertical integration, huge individual firms, and a high degree of
concentration only proved profitable in industries that met certain technological and economic preconditions-industries
"where the processes of production were capital intensive and
energy-consuming, and where the creation of a marketing organization assisted in the selling and distribution of mass-produced
products. " 5 Since Chandler believes that the electricalequipment and chemical industries did meet these preconditions,
his list of the priorities facing twentieth-century managers in
these industries resembles Noble's-for example, both authors
emphasize the ·need to design more efficient management methods and to organize large research establishments. But Chandler's explanation of the processes underlying the priorities is
more cogent, since it explains better why some industries and not
others had to recognize those priorities.
5. A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS 372 (1977).
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II
I might seem to have lavished inordinate analysis and criticism on only about 60 of the 320 pages of America by Design. I
have done so because most of the remaining 260 pages contain an
intellectual and, especially, an· institutional history of elite
groups-engineer-managers employed by leading industrial
firms, professors in engineering schools, and key figures in quasipublic agencies like the National Research Counci_l of the World
War I era. Noble analyzes in great and sometimes exhaustive
detail the programs and causes these elites supported and their
rationales for sponsoring them. Yet because of the weakness in
the foundation for these analyses, America by Design comes up
long on "design" and rather short on "America." This diminishes
its value as social history, especially from the-Marxian viewpoint
adopted, for that viewpoint assumes the close interaction of social, economic, and institutional forces (a point stressed in Chris-_
topher Lasch's foreword to the book itself [p. xiii]).
All this is not meant to deny the merit hi Noble's institutional and intellectual history of "corporate reform." Each of the
topics he deals with is significant, and the virtues and faults of
his treatment of them deserve attention. The first project that
he discusses-scientific and inclustrial standardization-seems
relatively clear-cut. While variety in consumer goods might
testify to the dynamism of free enterprise, a similar variety in the
materials and machinery used in industry conflicted with what
Noble sees as the requirements of the mass-production process
-"uniformity, precision, reproducibility, and predictability"
{p. 70). A need for fixed standards of quality and performance in
consumer goods also became evident as mass marketing evolved.
It was not surprising, therefore, that corporate engineers worked
for greater precision in scientific standards as a basis for those of
industry, or that when these efforts succeeded in creating a strong
National Bureau of Standards, that agency would offer services
of direct value to industry as well as to science {pp. 71-75).
Though the problem of industrial standardization proved to be
more complex than that of scientific standardization, Noble also
shows that by the late 1920s important changes, often spons9red
by the government, had come to the· electrical, chemical, and
auto industries-e.g., product simplification, standard specifications for parts and raw materials, and more precise methods for
rating the capabilities of materials and products (pp. 75-82).
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While the standardization Noble sketches seems to have
progressed rapidly and successfully, one doubts whether it
achieved, or was intended to achieve, the purposes he ascribes to
it. In his view the standardization movement aimed not only at
reducing inefficiencies due to diversity, but also at controlling
"competition in production," which engineers purportedly saw as
a threat to corporate stability (p. 70). Yet his own illustrations
show that standardization could work to increase competition as
well as to reduce it. In the electrical industry, standardization did
buttress the pre-eminence of General Electric, Westinghouse, and
American Telephone & Telegraph in many fields and thus promoted industrial concentration; but in the automotive industry,
it was first sponsored by smaller manufacturers, in order to break
the limited monopolies that individual parts suppliers which provided unique products often held over their customers {p. 79).
While Noble may be right in implying that cases like the former
outweighed those like the latter, he cites no quantitative evidence
that the trend lay in this direction.
According to Noble, the next link in the chain of corporate
hegemony over technology was the attempt to control the process
of invention, largely through the use of patents and organized
research. Relying heavily for his data on the electrical-equipment
industry-and again on General Electric, American Telephone &
Telegraph, and Westinghouse in particular-he claims that by
1929 the patent system had become a prop for corporate prerogatives instead of a spur to individual invention. This was allegedly
produced by action in three areas. First, the large corporations
adopted policies in handling patent matters that effectively
forced individual inventors to the wall. Thus, corporations intentionally used patent infringement suits to deplete a competitor's
resources, made restrictive patent-pooling and licensing agreements, and filed multiple auxiliary patents around a primary
patent to extend its useful life {pp. 91-95, 97-98). Second, firms
in science-based industry set up large in-house research organizations to develop new inventions systematically. Once these were
established, corporate managers gradually exerted greater control
over the work of their researchers. For example, they instituted
closer accounting· of the time and effort spent by individual researchers and subdivided research projects into specialized units;
in addition they began to require employees to sign over all patent
rights to potential inventions as a condition of employment, and
even eliminated bonuses for individual inventions {pp. 119-21,
101). Finally the corporations worked to "reform" the government
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patent apparatus by introducing predictability and efficiency
into its operations. These efforts first began to bear fruit during
World War I, when the-wartime regulation of industry encouraged
patent pools and other devices of value to large corporations; after
the war new laws gave the Patent Office a more "professional"
complexion and made the appeals process more centralized (pp.
102-08). The result, according to Noble, was a new "formalism"
in the patent system that put corporations at an even greater
advantage over individual inventors, since the latter found it difficult to cope with the "intricacies and complexities" of the new
procedures (pp. 108-09).
Noble draws a rather drastic conclusion about the cumulative effect of these changes: Because of them, and because the
courts refused to counteract them by applying antitrust laws
more vigorously to patent-related cases, by 1930 the patent process had become so corporatized "as to render subsequent judicial
and legislative efforts to check corporate monopoly through patent control too little, too late" (p. 88). He supports this statement
with statistics that show a trend in the direction claimed-by
1950, for example, fully seventy-five percent of new patents were
assigned to corporations. Also, in the late 1930s, seventeen percent of the patents went to large firms with over $50 million in
assets, while such firms had received only three percent in 1916.
Still, the apparent difference in the percentages for corporationheld patents and patents of major corporations indicates something less than the full-blown "corporate monopoly through patent control" that Noble's examples-like patent pooling among
such giants as General Electric and American Telephone & Telegraph-imply. 6 Furthermore, these relatively few examples are
restricted to the pre-1930 period; thus, they fail to justify the
claim that events since 1930 have been just more of the same, an
acute and conspicuous failure, since other writers on the
electrical-equipment industry have argued that the importance of
patent-pooling and licensing agreements in maintaining market
positions has declined markedly since World War II.7
6. This is not to say, however, that these examples are trivial or false. Leonard S.
Reich, in studying the early development of radio in detail, makes an argument similar
to Noble's about corporate research and patent strategies in that field and concludes that
"in almost every case, research became a more important factor in competition for monopoly control than in competition for shares of the market." Reich, Research, Patents and

the Struggle To Control Radio: A Study of Big Business and the Uses of Industrial
Research, 51 Bus. HlsT. REv. 209, 234 (1977).
7. See, e.g., J. BACKMAN, supra note 4, at 110-11; 1 R. SULTAN, PRICING IN THE ELECTRI-
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The problem of overstatement raised by Noble's discussion
of the patent system extends to his analysis of industrial research
as a whole. He seems to be trying to establish two distinct propositions-first, that industrial research became a largely corporate
endeavor and, second, that it became a tool of monopoly and
oligopoly-as though they were equivalent. In reviewing the expansion of in-house research between 1900 and 1930, he definitely
establishes the plausibility of the first; only relatively large industrial firms could mount a steady, successful research effort,
given the level of investment in personnel and facilities required
and the often long periods before any payoffs on investment were
realized. These constraints especially affected basic as opposed to
applied research, and the former assumed ever greater importance over the years in both the chemical and electrical sectors
(pp. 110-19). Demonstrating the second proposition, however,
requires evidence that over the long run the largest firms have
benefitted disproportionately from corporate industrial research;
· though he claims that they have (pp. 120-21), Noble does not
supply that evidence. In fact, the studies of the economist Edwin
Mansfield and his students indicate that the relationship between firm size and successful innovation is not simple and linear. Their most pertinent data come from an analysis of the
chemical industry since 1930 and suggest that the four largest
chemical firms did not innovate relatively more in products and
processes than their somewhat smaller competitors. The only exception was the disproportionate success in the area of products
of the largest firm, DuPont. But size alone could not have been
the determinant here, for the other three of the top four did not
approximate DuPont's degree of success. 8
The rise of corporate industrial research, Noble says, had
important human implications as well as economic ones, since
the development of "research management" methods prevented
truly free inquiry among employees in the industrial laboratories.
Because true cooperation presupposes "individual autonomy and
intention," and because the restraints researchers worked under
negated these, Noble concludes that "their activities did not reflect a spirit of cooperative investigation so much as one of collec28 (1974). Backman adds that patent monopoly, while very important in some product lines like electric lamps, has played a minor
role in other parts of the industry that are just as concentrated today.
8. E. MANSFIELD, THE PRODUCTION AND APPLICATION OF NEW INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY
66-67, 204-05 (1977).
CAL OLIGOPOLY: COMPETITION OR COLLUSION
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tive subservience" (p. 120). His own evidence, however, suggests
that this point has more formal than psychological validity for his
discussion of professionalization emphasizes that, after 1900, engineers generally saw their own career interests as bound up with
corporate needs, and he provides :no proof that corporate requirements such as teamwork and hierarchical organization weighed
more heavily on engineers in research departments than elsewhere in the firm. For scientists involved in basic research, his
analysis might be more apt, but Noble does not discuss the plight
of the scientist in the corporation in any detail; thus the supposed
disjunction between cooperation and "collective subservience" is
never illustrated.
A similar gap between institutional forms and the socioeconomic conclusions inferred from them also mars Noble's discussion of cooperation in research between industry and universities. As he demonstrates clearly, after 1900 corporate engineers
and their allies worked hard to make research in the universities
relevant to the needs of industry-to have the schools, as <;me of
them put it, become "integrated as res~arch centers within the
industrial structure" (p. 128). These efforts t<;>ok on many shapes:
firms supported university fellowships in industrial research, research institutes affiliated with schools undertook contract work,
and university engineering departments themselves often did the
same. At state universities the extension movement became more
utilitarian, and engineering "experiment stations" were promoted alongside agricultural ones. 9 Finally, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology introduced its influential Technology
Plan in 1920, which guaranteed participating firms that for a
standard fee they could gain access to MIT faculty for consulting
services and to MIT's personnel files for recruitment purposes
(pp. 123-43).
Developments like these obviously brought the universities
and the corporations closer together and mirrored a changing
conception of the university's role in society-the spirit of the
"multiversity" was already incarnate in programs like the Technology Plan. But Noble claims more-namely that such programs
both (a) "shifted the burden of some significant costs, and risks,
of modern industry from the private to the public sector" and (b)
put a new set of constraints on the pursuit of knowledge, con9. Pluralists will take comfort from the inability of a formidable array of elite educators, executives, and scientific organizations to convince the United States Congress to
support such stations (pp. 135-36).
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straints which meant that "science had, indeed, been pressed into
the service of capital" (p. 147). These conclusions are surely exaggerated. Regarding the first, Noble himself states that much of
the "reorientation" and expansion of university facilities was
being financed by industry or by philanthropic businessmen.
This being so, he ought to show as well that they somehow earned
a disproportionately high return on their investment, but this sort
of data is nowhere presented. As far as the enslavement of science
is concerned, most of Noble's examples of cooperation come from
engineering research. Though engineers repeatedly stressed that
basic science was becoming more and more important to industry, a key figure like William Wickenden could also assert that
they had to rely for basic research on "a vast army of free, disinterested and even impractical researchers" in the universities (p.
128). Obviously such talk of freedom and impracticality has to be
taken at less than full value; nevertheless, it shows that a divergence in both methods and goals between pure and applied science persisted and was recognized by elite engineers. Even the
National Research Council, a group which Noble portrays as dedicated to "closing the gap" between science and industry, recognized that divergence when in 1919 it decided that its programs
to encourage basic research and industrial research would have
to proceed independently of one another (p. 164). Also, the forces
repelling science and industry have probably intensified in many
fields since 1930, because an increasing proportion of basic research has come to be federally funded and subject to a different
set of priorities and constraints. 10
Though Noble's case that science was reoriented is less than
convincing, the "design" he discerns in the narrower field of technical education is visible to the reader. Corporate engineers, he
shows, disliked the system of technical higher education prevalent at the turn of the century for two basic reasons. First, as
outgrowths of the science curriculum, engineering courses, especially in chemical and electrical engineering, were heavily theoretical and insufficiently concerned with modern industrial practice. Second, the underfunded "shop work" that was supposed to
compensate for these faults usually lagged far behind the state of
the art in industry (p. 184). The largely successful attempts of
engineers to overcome these problems ran along two principal
10. For some figures on this shift, see N.
ECONOMIC GROWTH

177-83 (1972).
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lines-in-house post-graduate training within industrial firms
and cooperative-education programs in the engineering schools.
Noble recounts the history of pioneering efforts in both these
areas in detail, and what is more important, points out their
uniformity in method and rationale. The most significant product
of the in-house training idea was the corporation school; introduced by General Electric in the 1890s, it had spread by 1920 to
many other large corporations and, in industries made up of
smaller firms, to trade associations as well. These schools tended
to share four aims: to introduce the engineering graduate to the
full range of "real-world" technical problems of modern industry;
to instruct him in modern management methods; to socialize him
to the mores of corporate employment; and finally, to determine
his potential role in the firm by testing his strengths and weaknesses with the new techniques of "personnel management" (pp.
170-79).
Cooperative education, which combined alternating periods
of classroom instruction and actual work in industry, began in
1907 in the engineering department of the University of Cincinnati. Since cooperative education offered substantially the same
benefits to industry as the corporation school at the same or
smaller cost, it also became widespread by 1930. An interesting
and important variant was introduced at MIT after World War
I. As conceived by Magnus Alexander of General Electric for
electrical and by the MIT-trained consultant Arthur D. Little for
chemical engineering, the Institute co-op program was selective
in admissions and offered graduate degrees. Like General Electric's in-house program, it emphasized management skills such as
knowledge of economics and accounting. While the ordinary coop programs consciously aimed at producing "an engineer for
commercial production," MIT's program represented "an important new breeding-ground of America's corporate elite" (pp. 18095). A common rationale, however, lay behind both forms of cooperative education as well as behind the corporation schools-as
an official of New York Edison said, all these endeavors resulted
from the fact that "corporations . . . no longer expect to find
satisfactory help ready made, but are applying themselves to the
task of making men as well as commodities." Noble adds in an
ironic, though perhaps apt, aside that the real point had become
"the production of men as commodities" (p. 179).
Since engineers consciously saw education in terms of
"processing human material," it was logical that they would seek
standardized procedures for collecting supposedly "objective"
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information about students and for evaluating that information.
Thus, along with the corporation schools, engineering schools led
the way in developing systematic student records-including not
just grades, but scores on standardized tests, evaluations by professors, and character profiles-records explicitly geared to the
needs of actual and prospective employers. The complementarity
of early corporate and college "personnel" systems is nowhere
more clearly displayed than in the case of Purdue's engineering
school: designed by Dean A.A. Potter, the Purdue procedures
were not only adopted by other schools, but also became the
nucleus for Westinghouse's corporate personnel system (pp. 18889).
Having described the key features of the corporatization of
technical higher education, Noble goes on to tell in great, perhaps
excessive, detail the story of the national organizations that tried
to impose the new corporate style on American higher education
as a whole. The first great achievements of these groups came
during World War I, when corporate engineers and like-minded
educators held top administrative posts in the War Department
programs which sought to provide technically trained manpower
for the war effort. Through these programs and through the National Research Council, a semi-official body whose aim was to
mobilize the academic community, the engineers and their allies
managed to introduce industrial personnel methods into the
Army, to encourage wholesale use of aptitude and intelligence
testing, and to impose military training on students in more than
500 colleges (pp. 215, 207, 228, 218-21).
After the wartime emergency, Noble tells us, these people
returned to their primary task of coordinating education and industry; they worked through the successors of wartime agencies-the "permanent" National Research Council and the
American Council on Education, for example, as well as through
new policy research groups like the National Industrial Conference Board. Among other functions, these groups acted as clearinghouses for educational reform along corporate lines. Aided by
the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations, they also sponsored
studies in "personnel research," intelligence and aptitude testing,
and the like, work that engaged the talents of important psychologists like L.L. Thurstone and of well-known industrial psychologists like Elton Mayo (pp. 229-31, 254-55).
Those who commissioned these projects quite explicitly
stated that their ultimate objective was "to decide how education
can be organized to meet industrial specifications" (p. 254). Nor
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did they eschew manipulative means to their ends; rather, they
hoped "to find the critical tests that control individual conduct
and use these to secure voluntary cooperation and stimulate i:µdividual responsibility" {p. 229). They also sought to promote more
blatantly ideological causes such as "countering in the school
sinister industrial tendencies and fallacies" like socialism {p.
229). Finally, Noble shows that these organizations were able to
extend their influence, and thus the influence of "corporate reform," beyond the 1920s-the American Council on Education,
for example, not only became the principal accreditation agency
for American higher education, but its various programs in testing were the direct precursors of the now ubiquitous Educational
Testing Service {p. 255).
As the foregoing illustrates, Noble develops a strong case for
the idea that many familiar features of technical education, and
of higher education generally, were originally promoted as a
means of bringing the schools closer to meeting industrial
"specifications," as defined by individuals with a corporate
perspective. But on the crucial question of how great an impact
these new programs and methods actually had in determining the
nature of modern American higher education, he shows a proclivity here as elsewhere for overstrong conclusions. These new initiatives, he declares, effectively ushered in the control of higher
education by the "business principles" that Thorstein Veblen
had satirized and lamented in The Higher Learning in America.
That many academics did not and do not see this is to be expected, says Noble, for
the corporate reformers never required that all who pursued higher
learning in America be conscious of the utility of their work, nor
even that such work be of ultimate utility. Rather, they created an
institutional apparatus which would correlate the activities of academics "behind their backs," thereby rendering such consciousness of purpose unnecessary. [P. 245]

Anyone aware of the gulf that has often existed between
"service-oriented" university administrators and "intellectuals"
in faculties wants to sympathize with this assessment. Unfortunately, only in the field of technical education does Noble clearly
describe how the new systems qualitatively differed from the old.
It is not just a want of imagination that prompts the reader to
demand a glimpse of the "correlation" process at work in the
other parts of the academy, for the general "reform" causes promoted by Noble's elite seem to be primarily /ormal-recordkeeping, testing, accreditation, and the like. As such they would

702

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:685

be subject to various uses in practice, uses which cannot be predicted from the corporate engineers' purposes alone. Because of
this difficulty, the reader finds no grounds on which to conclude
that- "corporate reform" actually altered the modern American
university's status quo, which Laurence Veysey defines as a state
of permanent tension between a dominant, business- and serviceminded perspective and a less powerful, but still tenacious, viewpoint that stressed free inquiry, social criticism, and other "ivory
tower" objectives.1 1 Perhaps if Noble had chosen to write about
the 1930s or 1960s, periods in which business and corporate values
were vigorously attacked by intellectuals, he would have recognized that this tension survived early twentieth century
"corporate reform" and remained a source of worry for later generations of corporate spokesmen.
Ill

In the last section of America by Design, Noble moves away
from the universities and back toward industry. His theme is the
evolution of modern management and the corporate engineers'
role in that evolution. Again the framework is explicitly Marxian.
By the early twentieth century industrial corporations realized
that designing complex machinery to break the autonomy of
skilled workers could only extract part of the potential surplus
value of alienated labor. Corporations had also to undertake "the
deliberate engineering of the work place and the work activity of
labor" (pp. 259-60). According to Noble, science-based industry
was for three reasons especially subject to this new imperative.
First, the positivist attitude of many engineers proved amenable
to notions about rationalizing the human side of the industrial
process. Second, engineer-managers in these industries had half
won the battle, since they, not the workers, controlled most of the
information on which production depended. Finally, greater
productivity and stability in the labor force was critical to continuous utilization of expensive plant facilities, a need that all
highly concentrated industries felt (pp. 259-60).
Noble presents an impressive list of engineer-executives who
helped develop important tools of modern management-men
like Gerard Swope at General Electric, Alfred P. Sloan at General
Motors, and Hamilton Barksdale at DuPont (pp. 278-83). His
main concern, however, is with a single aspect of the new science
11. L.

VEYSEY,

THE
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of management-its handling of the "human problem," which
actually meant the problem of molding a docile and efficient work
force. In his view, efforts to solve the "human problem" ran along
two lines. The first, social engineering, involved "the conscious
attempt to exercise management prerogatives through the medium of the workplace, through organization of the work activity
of labor." The second, human engineering, "was the movement
to control the human element of production . . . through the
study and manipulation of human behavior" (p. 264).
Social engineering, as Noble defines it, first emerged clearly
in the work of Frederick W. Taylor and his followers in scientific
management. He provides a brief, synthetic account of Taylorism, based on the work of Samuel Haber and others; 12 that account's main purpose is to show how a "revisionist" conception
of scientific management had developed early in this century, a
conception that increasingly stressed problems like motivating
workers and retreated from the absolute rule of the stopwatch
(pp. 266-77). The new outlook in scientific management turned
out to be quite close to attitudes that were developing simultaneously among "corporate liberal" managers, since the latter especially desired to systematize and modernize the "welfare" programs that many firms had been supporting since the 1890s, as
well as to introduce more "scientific" procedures for handling
employees as individuals and in groups (pp. 286-95). The two
streams of management innovation, Noble argues, tended to coalesce between 1910 and 1930, to agree more and more that
"human engineering" was the sine qua non of effective management.
The range of projects that Noble treats under the rubric of
"human engineering" is broad-it includes "industrial relations"
research, the establishment of personnel departments, vocational
education and guidance in public schools, industrial psychology,
and the study of management in engineering schools. Except for
the last of these projects, his analysis deals mainly with the institutional role corporate engineers played in promoting and running them; it adds little to our knowledge of their content. As
with the reform of university education, the discussion does not
illuminate the vital problem of where projects succeeded or failed
in achieving corporate purposes.
12. See, e.g., H. AITKEN,
(1964); M.
1932 (1955).
CIENCY AND UPLIIT
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In his portrayal of modern management Noble does, however, provide valuable insights into why certain activities appealed to managers with an engineering background. One fine
example is his explanation for the vogue of early industrial psychology, which tended to emphasize both "hidden laws" of behavior and the nonrational sources of conduct. The first notion
attracted the engineer, Noble explains, because it promised a
degree of control over people comparable to that exerted over
inanimate objects, while the second allowed the engineer as manager to by-pass the troublesome phenomena of rational purpose
and conscious values in his workers {pp. 297-98). The discussion
as a whole would have been much stronger if this sort of clarity
about the motivations behind projects like industrial psychology
had extended to the accomplishments of these projects, or the
lack thereof.

IV
In exploring the genesis of modern management, Noble pays
more attention than in earlier parts of the book to groups who
opposed the plans of the corporate elite-mainly to the workers
who resisted scientific management and rejected corporate
"welfare" work, but also to other groups like the progressive educators who attacked vocational tracking systems for school children. With this shift in emphasis he seems to be setting the stage
for the qualified conclusions of his epilogue, conclusions which go
against the tone of much of the discussion in previous chapters.
For, in the epilogue, he tells us that the "designs" he has labored
to uncover have never been completely translated into reality,
because the structure that corporate engineers hoped to
strengthen was flawed from the beginning: it did not serve society
as a whole, but only "served the dominant class in society, that
class which, in order to survive, must forever struggle to extract
labor from, and thus control the lives of, the class beneath it."
No matter how much engineers might mislabel or disparage their
opponents, rational opposition to domination by corporate capital was bound to .exist, and thus opposition to the engineers'
"designs" was inevitable as well. And, Noble admonishes us, "no
myth of classlessness, no 'end of ideology' ideology, however comforting, however innocent, can ever obscure" these facts {pp. 32324).

Of course, the rhetoric is perfervid, but neither that fact nor
the invocation of the theory of surplus value is the key historical
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problem here. Rather, the problem is that Noble has introduced
some historical complexities that neither the tone nor the content
of his text have truly prepared us for; his failure to face these
complexities throughout has severely limited the persuasiveness
of his tale. All along we have been seeing with the eyes of the elite;
now that we hear about the existence of conflict we want to know
more about what the elite has been neglecting to tell us. Simply
invoking that conflict does not adequately reveal the interplay
between elite designs and events. But beyond this, Noble's concluding diagnosis of the reasons for conflict over corporate designs
oversimplifies recent American history; it underestimates the
true range of social forces and social perspectives that have done
battle over issues like the role of the university in society and the
aims and priorities of scientific research. Noble's Marxian viewpoint has sensitized him to the implications of clashes between
corporate managers and the working class; but divisions within
the middle-class that might undercut the hegemony of corporate
values he has largely ignored. Thus, the various middle-class
groups with vital interests wrapped up in the institutions that
were the objects of corporate "engineering plans"-i.e., the individual inventors, research scientists, university faculty and students, progressive reformers, and politicians-never receive their
due as actors in the American socioeconomic and political structure. Their actions, just as much as those of the engineers, must
be accounted for in explaining the shape of modern institutions.
When he debunks the myth of "the end of ideology" Noble
means not only that class conflict continues to exist, but also that
his twentieth-century corporate engineers have acted consistently
in ideological ways. Since he does indeed seem to have established the latter proposition, he has achieved much of the purpose
of America by Design. On the other hand, he clearly has fallen
short of showing that the resultant of those actions and countervailing forces has shifted science, technology, and education
themselves to an ideological role in American society. And it is
on this latter question that the real degree of subservience of
science and technology to corporate capital turns. Noble has
failed in this larger task mainly because all along he has insufficiently addressed the problem of pluralism in the modern American social order. Even when, in the political sphere, "pluralism"
stands discredited as a byword denoting an inability to confront
the reality of corporate power and the existence of elites, it remains a valid historical and sociological concept-valid, that is,
when it refers to the fact that social groups can arrange them-
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selves along other axes of conflict or cooperation besides ownership of the means of production. Institutions involved in the promotion and practice of science and technology have not been
immune to influence from these other kinds of intergroup division. It may be that the corporate elite's influence has been the
determining one since 1900, and the influence of labor its only
significant opposition, but examining elite organizations and attitudes cannot in itself establish this. Noble has thus been unable
to transform a solid piece on the history of a professional elite into
a compelling piece of social history.

